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The studies purporting to control for demand were themselves
demand-ridden (e.g., Durgin et al. 2012). Participants were
warned not to respond the way others did, inflating hill slant esti-
mates to please experimenters. Not surprisingly, those partici-
pants responded by giving low estimates of slant compared with
the estimates of unwarned participants. Far from eliminating
implicit demand, such instructions introduce explicit demand.
The literature on “debiasing” (e.g., Schwarz 2015) indicates that
such warnings tend to bias, rather than debias, judgments.
Participants in Durgin et al. (2009) were told that the backpack
contained equipment to measure muscle potential. An elaborate
story ensured that participants were alerted to the irrelevance of
their experience of the backpack for judging slant. Additionally,
a noisy cooling fan on the backpack served as a constant reminder
of its irrelevance. Rather than eliminating demand, the elaborate
effort to make the backpack both salient and distinct ensured that
its heaviness would be segmented from other bioennergetic cues
when making slant estimates. The results seem foreordained by
the procedures. The findings likely reflect not only the odd back-
pack manipulation, but also the fact that the “hill” was only a
2-meter-long ramp. This hill did not afford the opportunity to
walk more than a step or two, rendering any bioenergetic costs
of wearing a backpack irrelevant (Proffitt 2009).
To assess awareness, experimenters (e.g., Durgin et al. 2009) first
asked participants to consider the backpack heaviness and then
asked for their hypotheses. The literature on assessing awareness
has long warned against such procedures (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand,
2000; Dulany 1962), because participants cannot reliably distinguish
hypotheses elicited by being asked questions from hypotheses
actively generated during the experiment. To avoid such contamina-
tion, recommended methods involve carefully designed funnel
interviews (e.g., Dulany 1962), which were not used in this research.
Other studies have found that replenishing depleted glucose can
lower slant estimates (Schnall et al. 2010), but F&S suggest this
occurs not because changes in resources affect perception, but
because added glucose empowers participants to resist experi-
menter demands. We are not aware of any data supporting
glucose effects on susceptibility to demand. More important,
such suggestions cannot account for the results of multiple new
studies, only some of which we cited earlier, which are simultane-
ously immune to the criticisms of F&S and supportive of the per-
ceptual effects they attack.
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Abstract: Not only can the pitfalls that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) identify
be generalised across multiple studies within the field of visual perception,
but also they have general application outside the field wherever
perceptual and cognitive processing are compared. We call attention to
the widespread susceptibility of research on the perception of speech to
versions of the same pitfalls.
Firestone & Scholl (F&S) review an extensive body of research on
visual perception. Claims of higher-level effects on lower-level
processes, they show, have swept over this research field like a
“tidal wave.” Unsurprisingly, other areas of cognitive psychology
have been similarly inundated.
Auditory perception and visual perception are alike in the ques-
tions they raise about the interplay of cognitive processing with
sensory and perceptual analysis of a highly complex and externally
determined input; and like visual perception, the processes under-
lying auditory perception have been well mapped in recent
decades. Many of the features of the vision literature F&S note
have direct auditory counterparts, such as highly intuitive demon-
strations (the McGurk effect, whereby auditory input of [b] com-
bined with visual articulation of [g] produces a percept of [d];
McGurk & MacDonald 1976), control of peripheral attention
shift (the “cocktail-party phenomenon,” attending to one interlocu-
tor in a crowd of talking people), or novel pop-out effects, for
example, for certain phonologically illegal sequences (Weber 2001).
Auditory and visual perception differ, however, not only in
sensory modality but also in the input domain: Visual signals
play out in space; auditory input arrives across time. The temporal
input dimension has had implications for how the equivalent
debate in the speech perception literature has played out; it has
proved natural and compelling to treat the question of modularity
as one concerning the temporal order of processing – has the
bottom-up processing order (e.g., of speech sounds before the
words they occur in) been compromised? Studies in which ambig-
uous speech sounds are categorised differently in varying lexically
biased contexts (e.g., a [d/t] ambiguity reported as “d” before -eep
but as “t” before -eek because deep and teak are words but teep
and deek are not; Ganong 1980) were initially taken as evidence
for top-down effects. (Note, however, that rather than tapping
directly into perceptual processes, categorisation tasks may
largely reflect metalinguistic judgments, as per F&S’s Pitfall 2.)
This work prompted follow-ups showing, for example, stronger
lexical effects in slower responses (Fox 1984), and no build-up
of effects with an ambiguous sound in syllable-final rather than syl-
lable-initial position (McQueen 1991); these temporal arguments
suggested a response bias account (F&S’s Pitfall 3).
In general, F&S’s Pitfall 1 (a confirmatory approach) has been
the hallmark of much of the pro-top-down speech perception lit-
erature. Most of that literature takes the form of a catalogue of
findings that are consistent with top-down effects but are not diag-
nostic. There is frequently little evidence that alternative feed-
forward explanations have been considered. One of the few excep-
tions comes from the study of compensation for coarticulation, a
known low-level process in speech perception whereby cues to
phonetic contrasts may be weighted differently depending on
immediately preceding sounds. An influential study by Elman
and McClelland (1988) reported that interpretation of a constant
word-initial [t/k] ambiguity could be affected by the lexically
determined interpretation of a constant immediately preceding
word-final [s/sh] ambiguity (whether it served as the final sound
of Christmas or foolish). Pitt and McQueen (1998) reasoned
that if this compensation was a necessary consequence of the
lexical effect (rather than of transitional probability, as they
argued; that is, an artefact as per F&S’s Pitfall 4), then if there
is no compensation effect there should be no lexical effect
either. With the [s/sh] occurring instead in words balanced for
transitional probability ( juice, bush), the word-initial [t/k] com-
pensation disappeared; but the lexical [s/sh] effect remained.
Such studies (testing disconfirmation predictions) are, however,
as in the vision literature, vanishingly rare.
In our account in this journal of these and similar sets of studies
(Norris et al. 2000), we concluded, as F&S do for the vision liter-
ature, that there was then no viable evidence for top-down pene-
trability of speech-perception processes. In a more recent review
(Norris et al. 2016) we reach the same conclusion regarding
current research programs in which similar claims have been
reworded in terms of prediction processes (“predictive coding”).
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Priming effects (F&S’s Pitfall 6) are more or less the bread and
butter of spoken-word recognition research, so that psychological
studies tend to preserve the memory/perception distinction; but
in an essentially separate line of speech perception studies, from
the branch of linguistics known as sociophonetics, the distinction
has in our opinion been blurred. Typical results from this litera-
ture include listeners’ matching of heard tokens to synthesised
vowel comparison tokens being influenced by (a) telling partici-
pants the speaker was from Detroit versus Canada (Niedzielski
1999), (b) labeling participants’ response sheets “Australian”
versus “New Zealander” (Hay et al. 2006), or (c) having a
stuffed toy kangaroo or koala versus a stuffed toy kiwi in the
room (Hay & Drager 2010). In fairness to these authors, we
note that they do not propound large claims concerning penetra-
tion of cognition into primary auditory processing (they interpret
their results in terms of reference to listening experience). It
seems to us, however, that a rich trove of possible new findings
could appear if researchers would adopt F&S’s advice and
debrief participants, then correlate the match responses to
debriefing outcomes.
A comprehensive and thorough review of a substantial body
of research (with potentially important implications for theory)
is always a great help to researchers – and especially useful if it
uncovers new patterns such as, in this case, a systematic set of
deficiencies. But in the present article, a service has been per-
formed for researchers of the future as well, in the form of a
checklist against which the evidence for theoretical claims
can be evaluated. Only research reports that pass (or at least
explicitly address) F&S’s six criteria can henceforth become
part of the serious theoretical conversation. As we have indi-
cated, these criteria have application beyond visual perception;
at least speech perception can use them too. Thus, we salute
F&S for performing a signal service to the cognitive psychology
community. Bottoms up!
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Abstract: Firestone & Scholl (F&S) postulate that vision proceeds
without any direct interference from cognition. We argue that this view
is extreme and not in line with the available evidence. Specifically, we
discuss two well-established counterexamples: Attention directly affects
core aspects of visual processing, and multisensory modulations of
vision originate on multiple levels, some of which are unlikely to fall
“within perception.”
Firestone & Scholl (F&S) argue there is no good evidence for cog-
nitive penetration of perception, specifically vision. Instead, they
propose, visual processing is informationally encapsulated. Impor-
tantly, their version of encapsulation goes beyond Fodor’s original
proposal “that at least some of the background information at the
subject’s disposal is inaccessible to at least some of his perceptual
mechanisms” (Fodor 1983, p. 66). Their hypothesis is much more
ambitious: “perception proceeds without any direct, unmediated
influence from cognition” (sect. 5, para. 1). We will refer to this
view as total encapsulation.
One possible counterexample to total encapsulation is multi-
sensory modulation. For example, sounds in rapid succession
can induce the illusory reappearance of visual flashes (Shams
et al. 2000). Such reappearances increase objective sensitivity
for visual features of the flash (Berger et al. 2003) and are
linked to individual structure and function of primary visual
cortex (de Haas et al. 2012; Watkins et al. 2006). Waving one’s
hand in front of the eyes can induce visual sensations and
enable smooth pursuit eye movements, even in complete dark-
ness (Dieter et al. 2014). The duration of sounds can bias the
perceived duration of concurrent visual stimuli (Romei et al.
2011), and sensitivity for a brief flash increases parametrically
with the duration of a co-occurring sound (de Haas et al.
2013a). The noise level of visual stimulus representations in ret-
inotopic cortex is affected by the (in)congruency of co-occurring
sounds (de Haas et al. 2013b). Category-specific sounds and
visual imagery can be decoded from early visual cortex, even
with eyes closed (Vetter et al. 2014), and the same is true for
imagined hand actions (Pilgramm et al. 2016). At the same
time, the location of visual stimuli can bias the perceived origin
of sounds (Thomas 1941), and a visible face articulating a syllable
can bias the perception of a concurrently presented (different)
syllable (McGurk & MacDonald 1976). F&S argue that multi-
sensory effects can be reconciled with total encapsulation. The
inflexible nature and short latency of such effects would
provide evidence they happen “within perception itself,” rather
than reflecting the effect of “more central cognitive processes
on perception” (sect. 2.4, para. 1). However, multisensory
effects have different temporal latencies and occur at multiple
levels of processing, from direct cross-talk between primary
sensory areas to top-down feedback from association cortex (de
Haas & Rees 2010; Driver & Noesselt 2008). They may
further be subject to attentional (Navarra et al. 2010), motiva-
tional (Bruns et al. 2014), and expectation-based (Gau & Noppe-
ney 2015) modulations. Therefore, evidence regarding a strictly
horizontal nature of multisensory effects seems ambiguous at
best. If total encapsulation hinges on the hypothesis of strictly
horizontal effects, this hypothesis needs to be clearer. Specifi-
cally, what type of neural or behavioural evidence could refute it?
A second, perhaps more definitive, counterexample is atten-
tional modulation of vision. F&S acknowledge that attention can
change what we see (cf. Anton-Erxleben et al. 2011; Carrasco
et al. 2008) and that these effects can be under intentional
control. For example, voluntary attention can induce changes in
the perceived spatial frequency (Abrams et al. 2010), contrast
(Liu et al. 2009), and position (Suzuki & Cavanagh 1997) of
visual stimuli. Withdrawal of attention can induce perceptual
blur (Montagna et al. 2009) and reduce visual sensitivity
(Carmel et al. 2011) and sensory adaptation (Rees et al. 1997).
Nevertheless, F&S argue for total encapsulation. On such an
account, attention would not interfere with visual processing per
se but with the input to this process, “similar to changing what
we see by moving our eyes” or “turning the lights off” (sect. 4.5,
para. 4).
Attention-related spatial distortions and changes in acuity
have been linked to effects on the spatial tuning of visual
neurons (Anton-Erxleben & Carrasco 2013; Baruch & Yes-
hurun 2014). Receptive fields can shift and grow towards, or
shrink around, attended targets (e.g., Womelsdorf et al.
2008). Such effects go beyond mere amplitude modulation
and can provide important evidence regarding their locus. In
a recent study (de Haas et al. 2014), we investigated the
effects of attentional load at fixation on neuronal spatial
tuning in early visual cortices. Participants performed either
a hard or an easy fixation task while retinotopic mapping
stimuli traversed the surrounding visual field. Importantly,
stimuli were identical in both conditions – only the task instruc-
tions differed. Performing the harder task, and consequently
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